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In this study two-step cluster analysis was used in an exploratory effort to try and determine what 
the primary typologies of terrorism are in the United States based on the profiles of individual 
terrorist who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016. From this, it was discovered that 
terrorists in the United States can be classified into two overarching typologies. The first one can 
most appropriately be called political extremism and the second typology may be titled religious 
extremism. These findings suggest that terrorists have varying characteristics in accordance with 
which typology they are classified by. Moreover, this study also found that terrorists share some 
common characteristics that make them unique among other types of social deviants. 
 
Introduction 
There is no doubt that terrorism has become one of the most well-publicized issues of our time. 
However, despite its continual occupation in the headlines of news-outlets all across the western 
world, most notably since the events of September 11
th
, 2001, terrorism is in no way a new 
addition to the human experience. Indeed, its existence can be traced all the way back to the 
advent of the written word – and most likely, much longer than that. In its long and fairly well-
documented history, the sheer vastness in the manner in which it has manifested itself into the 
public sphere has changed substantially. Terrorism is a phenomenon constructed from mixed and 
often conflicting political and ideological perspectives. This makes attempts to try and 
holistically interpret and classify its true nature a highly elusive undertaking. Starting with 
Hebrew Zealots, who opposed the Roman Empire’s occupation of Palestine, terrorism sweeps 
across the historical time-line to the Jacobin’s Reign of Terror in revolutionary France, the 
anarchists struggle against Czarist Russia, the Algerian revolutionaries rise against French 
colonialism, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) opposition to British rule, and most recently, the 
international threat of Islamic extremism displayed most prominently by groups like Al-Qaeda 
(AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). In viewing terrorism across history, the phenomenon may best 
be described as a means by which a small group of extremists, with political persuasions from 
both the right and left and with ideologies ranging from Marxism to religious extremism, can 
carry out insurrections against their enemies (Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
In considering the multiple social, psychological, and political factors that drives people 
to become terrorists, the main purpose of the current study is to advance the research literature 
by better defining the different typologies of terrorism that exist based on the characteristics of 
the individuals who engage in terrorism. To this end, the current study uses the data mining 
technique of two-step cluster analysis to explore what the primary typologies of terrorism are in 
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the United States based on the profiles of individual terrorist who operated in the United States 
from 1948 – 2016. 
 
The Current Study 
 
To date, many research efforts attempting to categorize terrorism into typologies have been made 
primarily through the use of two methods. The first is to use case studies that focus on a small 
sample of terrorists to try classify them based on a thick, rich description of the phenomenon. 
However, this approach has a limited capacity for replication or for transferring conclusions into 
more generalized explanations (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). The second is to aggregate 
terrorists into large samples and to categorize them based on overarching themes. The drawback 
to this approach is that it can be overly broad and often fails to capture contextual qualities and 
peculiarities among cases (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). 
 In this current research project I hope to strike a balance between these two methods by 
following up on a recommendation made in Chenoweth and Lowham (2007) to use the unique 
capacity of cluster analysis in order to take an expansive view of terrorism over multiple time 
periods while preserving the comprehensive qualities that can get easily lost in other types of 
large-scale evaluations. Moreover, the current study differs from most other attempts at 
categorizing terrorism because I redirected the level of analysis away from the group-level and 
towards the individual terrorists themselves. To this end, I used the profiles of individual 
extremists, who operated in the United States during the years 1948 – 2016, in order to classify 
them across three different dimensions: demographics, personal history, and recruitment-
radicalization processes. By classifying cases in this manner, it is my intention to delve deeper 
into the multiplicity of factors that surround terrorism so that clear distinctions can be made into 
its typologies at the most intimate level. It is my hope that in grouping forms of terrorism based 
on individual terrorists’ characteristics, policymakers will gain a more comprehensive picture of 
how terrorists are both alike and different from one another, and that these insights will help to 
guide them towards constructing counterterrorism policies that are able to adapt to the multiple 
versions of terrorism that have and continue to exist in the United States.  
 
Criteria Used to Define an Individual as a Terrorist 
 
Before moving on to a review of the literature that helped to shape the direction of this research 
project, it is important to note what criteria was used in this study to define a person as a 
terrorist. Since all the data used in this study was acquired through the Profiles of Individual 
Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset, I adopted the same criteria established by 
the dataset developers. Therefore, in this study, individuals were considered terrorists if they had 
espoused Islamist, far right, far left, or single issue ideologies, radicalized within the United 
States to the point of committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, 
joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an extremist organization whose 
leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense (National 










Terrorist Attacks in the United States 
 
Although media outlets often try to portray the United States as being the primary focus of 
transnational terrorism, researchers examining the trajectory of the problem have determined that 
it is much less of a threat than what is often portrayed by the media (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). 
With regard to the total number of the terrorist attacks directed against the U.S., incidents spiked 
in the 1970s and 1980s and then declined during the 1990s (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009).  
Although terrorist attacks against the United States did show an increase in the early 1990s, these 
trends did not reach the same heights as seen in the 1970s or 1980s. In fact, attacks against U.S. 
targets were actually at a 35-year low just before 9/11 (LaFree et al., 2009). Moreover, among 
the terrorist attacks that have been conducted against U.S. targets, only a fraction of them 
actually took place on U.S. soil – with most of the assaults striking at American targets in other 
countries (LaFree et al., 2009).  
Despite the relatively small number of completed attacks against American targets since 
9/11, U.S. authorities have intercepted a large number of plots by jihadist terrorists before they 
were ever fully carried out. Among these plots, most of them never went beyond the preparation 
phase, and of the ones that did, very few accomplished the full amount of damage that was 
intended. To help put this in perspective, the New American Foundation found that from 2005 – 
2015, 94 U.S. citizens were killed by jihadist terrorists, which is a small portion when compared 
to the number of people killed in such events as mass shooting during this same time period 
(Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Laqueur and Wall (2018) identify two essential reasons why only 94 
people died from jihadist terrorism during this time period. The first reason is the United State’s 
ability to integrate and assimilate its Muslim population into the mainstream culture. The second 
reason is the security reforms that were implemented by the U.S. government in the aftermath of 
9/11.  
With the expansion of such things as the internet and social media, many jihadist terrorist 
attacks that have occurred in the United States have been conducted by individuals who were 
guided, directed, or inspired by foreign elements such as the Islamic State (Asongu, Orim, & 
Nting (2019); Laqueur &Wall, 2018; Zeman, Břeň, & Urban, 2017). This can be seen in such 
attacks as the Garland Texas shooting in May 2015, the San Bernardino shooting in December 
2015, and the Pulse nightclub shooting in June 2016 (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). It is also important 
to keep in mind that many of these shooters were born or grew up in the United States and were 
radicalized while living in the U.S. (Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
Besides jihadist terrorism, the other substantial terror threat that the United States 
currently faces comes from right-wing extremists (Becker, 2014). Although other forms of 
terrorist ideologies such as left-wing extremism and radical environmentalists do exist in the 
U.S., in terms of actual incidents of violence, these forms of extremism are currently not as 
prevalent as right-wing violence (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Individuals fitting into the right-wing 
mode of terrorism can be categorized as Christian extremists, white-supremacists, anti-
government groups, and militia groups. Their violence tends to be directed at members of 
minority groups such as Jews, Muslims, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. A 
few examples of these kinds of attacks include: the Oklahoma City bombing, Charleston church 
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shooting, and the 2009 attack against the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. The emerging 
threat that right-wing extremism poses to the United States by alt-right and anti-government 
groups is demonstrated by the fact that, in 2017, thirteen terrorist incidents took place in the 
United States. Of these attacks, only two can be attributed to jihadist terrorist; the rest came from 
the extreme right (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). It is also important to keep in mind that terrorist 
attacks committed by right-wing extremists may be underrepresented in the U.S. since such acts 
are not always labeled as terrorist events by the U.S. legal system due to hate-crime laws. Still, 




Concerning the demographic information of individual terrorists, it is almost universally 
accepted by scholars that acts of terrorism are predominantly committed by young males 
(Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman, 2008; Russell & Miller, 1977). Traditionally, 
researchers have identified perpetrators of terror as being unmarried (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & 
Gruenwald, 2015). However, to the contrary, Sageman (2008) determined that the vast majority 
of jihadist terrorists are married and have children. Most researchers have found that terrorists 
are generally well educated, and come from middle to upper-class backgrounds (Berrebi, 2007; 
Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2008). Such 
commonalities among the demographic characteristics of terrorists are understandable when 
considering the nature of terrorism from psychological, sociological and organizational 
perspectives. It is no secret that young males are more prone to experiencing feelings of anger 
towards their society and to act out violently when compared to young females or older 
individuals (Hegghammer, 2006).   
 Moreover, terrorist recruiters tend to focus their attention on drawing young people to 
their cause because, in many cases, the young have not lived long enough to establish a strong 
sense of identity, and are therefore more likely to be attracted to an organization that offers them 
an opportunity to develop a strong sense of self-worth. From the standpoint of the organization, 
young individuals are less likely to be spies and can be more easily molded into the roles 
required by the organization (Hegghammer, 2006). The fact that terrorists are often intelligent, 
well-placed individuals is not really all that surprising when one considers that terrorist 
organizations, like other organizations, acknowledge the value that education and the attainment 
of specific skill sets has in predicting an individual’s ability to plan and carry out complex 
operations (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Hegghammer, 2006; Krueger & Malecova, 2003; 
Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
 
Terrorists’ Personal History 
 
The factors in a person’s life that compels them to become a terrorist are a chain of highly 
complex motivators that are interwoven into people’s psychological and social development. In 
terms of psychological factors, researchers have generally determined that very few terrorists can 
be classified as being mentally disturbed, at least in the traditional sense of having officially 
recognized mental health diagnoses (Becker, 2014; Laqueur & Wall, 2018). However, several 
researchers have determined that lone wolf terrorists have a higher probability of having mental 
health diagnoses than group-based terrorists (Corner & Gill, 2015; Hewitt, 2003). For example, 
Corner and Gill (2015) concluded that the rate of mental illness for lone wolf terrorists was 
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31.9% compared with 3.4% for group-based terrorists among the individuals in their study’s 
sample. One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals with mental illnesses are 
more likely to be rejected by terrorist recruiters because recruiters believe that these individuals’ 
mental states make them unfit to join their organization. Despite this rejection, such people often 
maintain their fervent devotion to the terrorist cause, and therefore, decide to carry out attacks on 
their own without any assistance from the organization they once tried to join (Jones, 2017).   
In terms of sociological factors, most people become terrorists due to their devotion to a 
radical cause; although, the exact degree of their devotion varies from person to person. Still, an 
intense devotion to a particular radical cause is not, by itself, a sufficient explanation as to why 
an individual decides to become a terrorist since many people are intensely aligned with all sorts 
of radical causes who never resort to terrorism. Three other common factors that help prime 
people to become terrorists are personal grievances, personal relationships, and thrill and status 
seeking motivations. For instance, some people join terrorist organizations due to wanting to take 
revenge against their government because of a personal injury (personal grievance), some join 
because a person they care about (e.g., friend, relative, romantic partner) is a member of the 
group and recruits them (personal relationship), and some join in search of excitement, status, or 
money (thrill and status seeking motivations) (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). Laqueur and 
Wall (2018) note that historically speaking, the one main commonality that helps to designate 
whether a person becomes a terrorist is if they have a family member or friend already involved 
in the cause. Another major commonality identified by the other was that terrorists often reflect 
the best and brightest of their society when accounting for their education levels and the fact that 
most come from middle to upper-class family backgrounds. However, despite these advantages, 
they find themselves feeling extremely isolated and alienated from the society in which they live.  
 
Terrorists’ Recruitment-Radicalization Processes  
 
Although at first glance, the recruitment and radicalization processes that turn people into 
terrorists may seem indistinguishable from one another, and indeed, the two concepts often 
coincide with each other, recruitment and radicalization are actually two separate things. 
Recruitment refers to the specific process through which un-initiated individuals are courted and 
assessed for their potential value to a terrorist organization by individuals who are already 
established members of that organization. Radicalization is the process that occurs when an 
individual’s belief system is modified in order to align it with the doctrine of the terrorist 
organization (Jones, 2017).  
 
Recruitment. To understand terrorist recruitment, it is helpful to consider that, just like other 
kinds of organizations, terrorist organizations have specific criteria regarding the types of 
individuals they want to recruit. As such, for the purposes of resource allocation and cost-saving 
measures, terrorist organizations seek to focus their recruiting efforts on the type of individuals 
they predict will be the most productive members of their organization (Hunter, Shortland, 
Cryane, & Ligon, 2017). There is evidence that terrorist organizations look for people with 
certain personality traits as well. For example, an al-Qaida manual known as the Manchester 
Manual outlines 14 different qualities desirable in potential recruits including (e.g., intelligence, 
maturity, truthfulness, the ability to observe, and the ability to conceal oneself) (Hegghammer, 
2006). To this end, terrorist organizations do not seek to recruit just anyone, but instead pre-
screen potential recruits to verify that they have the proper personality traits and knowledge 
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regarding the organization’s cause, ideology, and history. Likewise, Terrorist recruiters use a 
variety of methods to try and quantifying that individuals are competent in the special skills 
required to carry out combat operations (e.g., weapons, tactics, bomb-making) and for daily 
activities (e.g., computer engineering, and social media skills) (Hegghammer, 2006). This idea is 
expanded even further by the understanding that individuals are recruited to hold multiple and 
changing roles within a terrorist organization. Which means that the process of recruitment and 
selection fluctuates based on the role or roles the prospective recruit will hold in the organization 
(Horgan, Shortland, Abbasciano, & Walsh, 2016; Hunter et al., 2017). 
Although it seems that terrorist recruiters use many of the same techniques and standards 
when initiating people to their organization that legitimate organizations do when searching for 
new employees, it is quite apparent that the factors that drive a person to become a terrorist are 
substantially different from those that compel people to apply for traditional occupations such as 
a banker, firefighter, or nurse. On many levels, being a terrorist is not a particularly enviable way 
for one to live their life. Terrorism, by its very nature, does not allow its adherents to live a 
conventional lifestyle that most people desire and are afforded. Not to mention, people engaged 
in terrorism have to live most of their lives in hiding from authorities, are often subjugated to 
lengthy prison terms, and have a very high probability of being killed at an early age.  
Currently, the hypotheses explaining why people become terrorists are divided into push 
and pull factors. Push factors have to do with the social, economic, and political forces which 
cause people to see society as unjust and discriminatory, and that fosters their aspirations to take 
violent action against those they believe have wronged them and what they stand for.  Pull 
factors have to do with the innate human desires to want to belong to a higher cause, to seek out 
adventures, and to do something worthwhile with one’s life (Jones, 2017). In this way, the 
process of terrorist recruitment is often encompassed within the grand narrative that portrays 
society as being  terminally flawed (push factors) and the individual terrorist as having a moral 
duty to go on a heroic quest to right the wrongs imposed on them and their people by the unjust 
powers that be (pull factors). Such a narrative is especially appealing to young recruits because it 
offers them the opportunity to shed their old identity for a new emboldened one (Choudry, 2007; 
Pfundmair, Aßmann, Kiver, Penzkofer, Scheuermeyer, Sust, & Schmidt, 2019). An identity that 
induces complete loyalty to the terrorist organization because it is empowered by the level of 
devotion that recruits have to the sacred values inscribed in the terrorist ideology (Atran, 2010).   
 
Radicalization. The process through which an individual is radicalized can happen gradually 
with a tipping point culminating in their final transition or may be achieved within a short period 
of time. In terms of terrorism, radicalization is the progression from feeling sympathy towards a 
terrorist cause to the direct Matusitz, 2020). involvement in such activities (Neumann, 2013). 
Generally, radicalization can happen in one of two ways: top-down or bottom-up.  Top-down 
occurs when new recruits are gradually radicalized through a structuralized recruiting and 
training process. An example of a top-down approach would be when recruits attend a terrorist 
training camp where they undergo extensive training in military tactics, are indoctrinated in the 
ideology of the group and begin to form personal bonds with other members of the group 
(Hegghammer, 2006). Bottom-up refers to situations where individuals first self-radicalize and 
then intentionally seek out a recruiter with the intentions of joining the terrorist organization 
(Hegghammer, 2006). This process of self-radicalization is becoming more and more prevalent 
today through the widespread use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and WhatsApp by terrorist groups (Edwards & Gribbon, 2013). By using social media 
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in this way, terrorist organizations are now able to connect with potential recruits all over the 
world without having to meet with them face-to-face (Toevs, 2020). Through the use of such 
technologies as encryption software and the dark web, extremists are now able to create virtual 
environments where they can freely and covertly spread ideas that are unacceptable in open-
society, to people all across the globe with little fear of being intercepted by government forces 
(Neumann, 2012). 
 
Terrorist Typologies  
 
As discussed in the introduction, terrorism exists in many different forms in terms of ideological 
motivations, organizational structure, tactics and overall objectives.  At its most basic level, 
terrorism should not be viewed as a single ideological perspective adopted by a particular type of 
organization, but rather as a method of operation assumed by a variety of organizations to 
advance their specific causes forward (Kis-Katos, Liebert & Schulze, 2012; Laqueur, 2003; 
Mullins & Thurman, 2011). Given these distinctions, it is essential to classify terrorists into 
different typologies in order to find out what characteristics are transferable across different time 
periods and locations and which ones are unique to the specific context in which they exist. 
However, due to its ever-evolving nature, terrorism is notoriously difficult to classify. Take for 
example that back in 1988, when the classification of terrorist organizations was just starting to 
develop in the empirical literature, Schmid and Jongman identified as many as 31 different 
typologies of terrorism.  
Generally, most large-scale assessments have tended to focus their level of analysis at the 
group-level and classify terrorist organizations primarily based on their origin or ideological 
motivations – such as far-right, Marxist, nationalists, single issue (e.g., anti-abortionist and 
environmentalists), and religious extremists (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007; Chermak & 
Greuenewald, 2015; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism [START], 2018; Piazza, 2009). Another popular method for classifying terrorism is to 
make divisions based on historical movements (e.g., anarchism, anti-colonialism, left-wing 
radicalism, and religious terrorism) (Rapoport, 2001). While such classification methods are 
advantageous for their sharp, clear distinctions, they also tend to exclude the intricate details that 
help to explain how different version of terrorism both match and differ from one another 
(Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). To help prevent these intricate details from being lost, it seems 
appropriate to shift the level of analysis away from the group and towards the individual level 
when attempting to divide terrorism into typologies. However, attempts to classify terrorists into 
typologies according to individual characteristics of its practitioner is largely absent from the 




In this exploratory study the following three research questions were asked:  
 
Q 1:  How many primary typologies of terrorism exist in the United States based on the 
profiles of individual terrorist who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016? 
 
Q 2:  In what ways are terrorists from different typologies similar to one another? 
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The current study is based on data obtained from the (PIRUS) dataset, which is a publically 
available dataset operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. It provides individual-level information on 
the backgrounds, attributes, and radicalization processes for over 1,800 violent and non-violent 
extremists who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016 (National Consortium for the 




In order to classify individual extremists into terrorist typologies, I utilized the Statistical 
Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to conduct a two-step cluster analysis. Cluster 
analysis is an exploratory data mining technique used to discover naturally occurring groups 
within complex datasets so that data may be retrieved, understood, and evaluated in a quick and 
easy manner. (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). Cluster analysis works towards dividing 
cases according to their similarity on one or more dimensions, and thus, produces groups where 
the objects within the group are more similar to each other than to those in other groups 
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990). Two-step cluster analysis, was chosen for this study because 
the algorithm that it employees has several features not possible with traditional clustering 
techniques. More specifically, I chose this clustering technique based on three main features. 
One, by constructing a cluster features (CF) tree that summarizes all records, two-step clustering 
is uniquely compatible with large datasets such as the one used in this study. Second, by using a 
log-likelihood measure, it assumes all variables to be independent and places a normal 
distribution on continuous variables and a multinomial distribution on categorical variables, thus, 
making it capable of handling both types of variables simultaneously. Third, by comparing the 
values of a model-choice criterion across different clustering solutions, the procedure 
automatically determines the optimal number of clusters (“TwoStep Cluster Analysis,” n.d.). 18 
separate variables were entered into the analysis based on three different dimensions of the 
terrorist profile: demographics, personal factors, and recruitment-radicalization processes. The 
demographics dimension looks at the identifying characteristics of individuals such as religion, 
age, marital status, etc. The personal factors dimension may be defined as key factors in an 
individual’s history that can act as predictors of their future behavior such as mental illness, 
criminal history, drug use and military history. The recruitment-radicalization processes 
dimension considers the manner in which an individual was recruited and the process by which 
they were radicalized into becoming a terrorist. This is measured through such factors as their 
ideology, beliefs, and the length of their radicalization process. Table 1 displays each of the 18 









Using the study’s criterion, the two-step cluster analysis compared values across different 
clustering solutions to determine that the optimum number of clusters for this dataset is two. This 
means that each case was reported to fit into one of two clusters, with 48.1% (41 cases) fitting 
into the first group and 51.9% (38 cases) fitting into the second group. This finding indicates that  
 
Table 1 
18 Variables Used in the Cluster Analysis in Accordance with Their Profile Dimension 
Demographics Personal Factors  Recruitment-Radicalization Processes 
Religious Background Previous Criminal Activity Terrorist Ideology 
Ethnicity Alcohol/Drug abuse Radical Beliefs 
Time in the U.S. Military History Radicalization Duration 
Age Mental Illness Radical Behaviors 
Marital Status  Media Radicalization 
Number of Children   
Level of Education   
Social Stratum   
Employment Status   
Table 2 
Two-Step Cluster Analysis Results 
Variables Cluster 1 (51.9% = 41 Cases) Cluster 2 (48.1% = 38 Cases) 
Religious Background Unspecified Christianity (29.3%) Sunni Islam (42.1%) 
Time in the U.S.   (379.37 Months)  (215.29 Months) 
 Ethnicity  
 




Far-Right (34.1%) Islamic (92.1%) 
Age 
 
33.27 yrs. old  25.26 yrs. old  
Radical Beliefs 
 
Deep commitment to radical 
ideological beliefs (70.7%) 
Shared many of the same 
beliefs of radical ideology 
(28.9%) 
Previous Criminal Activity  None (46.3%) None (89.5%)  
Social Stratum  Middle-Class (46.3%) Middle-Class (84.2%) 
Marital Status  Married (48.8%) Single (65.8%) 
Radicalization Duration Long (53.7%) Medium (57.9%) 
Number of Children  None (31.7%) None (73.7%) 
Radical Behaviors  Active participant in operations 
intended to cause casualties 
(61%) 
Active participant in 
operations intended to cause 
casualties (42.1%) 
Alcohol/Drug Abuse None (65.9%) None (86.8%) 
Employment Status  Employed (46.3%) Employed (65.8%) 
Media Radicalization None (39%) None (50%) 
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there are mainly two overarching typologies of terrorism based on the profile characteristics of 
individual terrorists. Table 2 presents each of the 18 variables entered into the analysis along 
with its most frequent value for the cases in that cluster. The variables are shown in rank order, 
ranging from the variable with the most predictive power (religious background) at the top to the 
variable with the least predictive power (psychological history) at the bottom. 
The following sections describe in detail how cases were categorized based on 
similarities and differences among each of the variables. The reader will note that the divisions 




With regard to religious background, the majority of cases in cluster 1 fell into one of several 
different Christian denominations, with a good portion being Jewish or new religion 
(Scientology, Satanic, New Age, etc.) while the majority of cases in cluster 2 were classified into 
one of several types of Islamic denominations. With regard to ethnicity, a vast majority of 
terrorists in cluster 1 were white while the majority of terrorists in cluster 2 were identified as 
being Middle Eastern/North African. It is notable that ethnicity within cluster 2 was more 
diversified than that of cluster 1, with a large number of cases being identified as being Asian 
and a smaller number identified as Black or White. Concerning time spent in the U.S., terrorists 
in cluster 1 tended to live in the U.S. for a longer period of time before public exposure than 
those in cluster 2 (379.37 months versus 215.29 months). With regard to age, terrorists in cluster 
1 tended to be older than those in cluster 2 (33.27 yrs. versus 25.26 yrs.).  In terms of marital 
status, the majority of cases in cluster 1 were married, with the next largest portion being single. 
In cluster 2, the majority of cases were shown to be single with next largest portion being 
married. In terms of their number of children, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had 
no children, although, a large number of cases in cluster 1 did have at least one child. With 
concern to their level of education, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 tended to have 
at least some college or vocational training, although, the cases in cluster 2 were slightly more 
likely to have advance degrees. Concerning what social stratum they came from, cases in cluster 
1 tended to be in the low to middle-class stratum while a large majority of cases in cluster 2 were 
in the middle-class stratum. In terms employment status, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 
and 2 were found to be employed; however, a good portion of cases in cluster 1 were 
unemployed while almost all cases in cluster 2 were employed.   
 
Personal History  
 
Concerning their previous criminal activity, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had no 
previous criminal activity prior to radicalization, although, a fair portion of individuals in cluster 
1 did have a history of both violent and non-violent crime, while very few individuals in cluster 2  
had any  previous history of criminality. With concern to their alcohol/drug abuse history, the 
majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had no history of abuse, although, a fair amount of 
cases in cluster 1 did have a history of abuse. Regarding their military history, very few 
Military History  None (75.6%) None (92.1%) 
Level of Education Some College (36.6%) High school diploma (31.6%) 
Mental Illness  None (73.2%) None (78.9%) 
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individuals in both clusters 1 and 2 had history in the military. Likewise, this was the case for 
their history of mental illness.  
 
Recruitment-Radicalization Processes  
 
With concern to terrorist ideology, a slight majority of individuals in cluster 1 were radicalized 
into far-right movements; however, cases were distributed proportionally with a good number of 
individuals radicalized into radical-Islamic, far-left, and single-issue ideologies. However, this 
was not the case for cluster 2 where almost all of the cases were radicalized into a radical-Islamic 
ideology. In terms of the amount if radicalization that was evident in the individual’s belief 
system, the majority of people in cluster 1 had a deep commitment to their radical ideological 
beliefs. The majority of people in cluster 2 were slightly less committed in terms of how their 
personal beliefs reflected the radical ideology they professed.  Concerning the duration of their 
radicalization process, the majority of cases in cluster 1 were radicalized over a long period of 
time with a good number of cases radicalized over a medium period of time. The majority of 
cases in cluster 2 were radicalized for a medium period of time with good portion radicalized 
over short and long time spans. In regards to radical behaviors, the majority of cases in both 
clusters 1 and 2 actively participated in terrorist plots in which they intended to bring about the 
death of others in a direct manner, while a smaller proportion of cases played roles in terror plots 
that would not make them directly responsible for causing the death of others. Regarding the role 
that the media played in their radicalization process, the media played no role in the radical 
process for a slight majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 and did play at least some role for a 




The two cluster solution regarding the number terrorist typologies present in the data was an 
unexpected finding. Given the long time span that the dataset covered, the amount of diversity 
within the individual profiles, and the number of different variables entered into the model, I 
fully believed that the number of clusters found in the data would be greater than two. However, 
after careful inspection of the data, I’ve reached the conclusion that the results reveal many sharp 
distinctions between variables that would most likely have been mitigated if the cases would 
have been divided into more than two clusters. Therefore, I am in agreement with the findings 
that a two cluster solution is the best answer for the dataset, and is in accordance with what past 
researchers have said about the differences in the typologies of terrorism.  
The cleavages made between the variables of each group reveal that, broadly speaking, 
there are two distinct terrorist typologies that exist in the United States. Individuals in cluster 1 
can most appropriately be classified as being older, white, mainly associate with a denomination 
of Christianity, who have lived in the U.S. for a long period of time, and whose extremist 
ideology is mainly driven by nationalistic and political factors. Individuals in cluster 2 tended to 
be younger, of Middle-Eastern or North African descent, lived in the U.S. for a shorter period of 
time than those in cluster 1, and had an extremist ideology which can most appropriately be 
classified as being religiously motivated. These typologies draw a line between what has been 
described as being the traditional politically motivated version of terrorism and religious 
extremism or what has also been called the new face of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & 
Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001).   
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Those who fit into the politically motivated version of terrorism use violence as a 
revolutionary means to bring about clearly defined changes to the current political order. 
Whether their political ideology is from the far-right (e.g., anti-government and white 
supremacists), far-left (Marxist-Leninists), or based on a single issue (e.g., anti-abortionist and 
environmentalists), these individuals seem best described as being spurred on by political issues. 
Currently, in the United States, this type of terrorist is best represented by the far-right in such 
forms as anti-government militias and white nationalists. However, in the past, this typology has 
been represented by far-left groups such as the Weather Underground.  
Those individuals who may be described as being religious extremists misuse and abuse 
religious doctrine in order to attract recruits from all over the globe towards a universal cause 
that transcends language, culture, and political ideology. This mode of terrorism does not intend 
to re-order an existing secular political order so that it can be brought into alignment with what 
they perceive to be a justified political structure, but rather, they deny any type of secular 
political order to be justified. To them, the only law that has any validity is the law of God 
(Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001). Therefore, the focus of such terrorists 
is not on the political structure but rather on the individual person. Their primary mission is to 
have all humanity embrace the only true ideology and those who refuse to do so should be 
eliminated, or at least, relegated to second or third-class citizenship for their unbelief (Hoffman, 
1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001).  
Before proceeding forward, it is worth pausing for a moment in order to fully clarify four 
essential aspects of these typologies. First, the religious extremist typology does not consist 
exclusively of radical jihadists. Historically speaking the Zealots of ancient Judea, the Shiite 
Assassins in Persia during the Crusades, the Thuggee cult of India, and the Aum Shinrikyo cult, 
which orchestrated sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, all fit into this 
classification of terrorism as well (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). However, it is clearly evident that 
radical jihadism is the most dominant version of religious extremism that currently exists in the 
United States and other parts of the world, with very little competition on the horizon threatening 
to upstage its reign.  
Second, the characteristics of these typologies is not in any way mutually-exclusive to 
one another, but instead exist between typologies within a proportional scale. Although it is true 
that religious extremism is the primary motive of radical jihadists, this is an oversimplification of 
the problem. Radical jihadist movements also have a powerful presence in the political sphere. 
For example, during the Islamic State’s (IS) brief territorial rule over failed-states such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, it engaged in such overtly political operations as reformulating laws according 
to sharia, implementing a system for taxation , debating health care policy, and implementing a 
new court system (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Moreover, in many cases, there is a strong religious 
influence among politically motivated terrorists. Far-right terrorist groups in the United States 
have had an historical connection with Christianity. The Ku Klux Klan, anti-government militias, 
anti-Semitic groups, and white nationalists are just a few examples of terrorists who misuse 
elements of Christian doctrine to help justify their extremist views. 
Third, the two typologies are not entirely homogenous. That is to say, the two typologies 
created in the cluster analysis represent the most prominent distinctions that can be made 
between the variables at the aggregate level, but the individuals within each cluster still contain 
many micro-level differences when compared to other members of that group. For instance, the 
cases within cluster 1 could be further sub-divided into right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue 
extremists. Moreover, even though the ideology for the vast majority of cases in cluster 2 can be 
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classified as being part of the radical jihadist movement, this movement is far from uniform. For 
example, there was considerable differences of opinion among the top leadership of the Islamic 
State and al-Qaeda over such issues as how to treat non-Sunni Muslims and what constitutes 
religious orthodoxy, which eventually caused a schism between the two groups and has even led 
to them fighting one another within the various Middle-Eastern conflicts that have emerged in 
the post-Arab Spring world (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). 
Fourth, there are many characteristics that terrorists in both typologies have in common. 
For instance, many terrorists in both groups tended to have a strong commitment to radical 
ideological beliefs, had no previous history of criminal activity, came from middle-class or a 
higher social stratum, had some history of employment, had no history of drug or alcohol abuse, 
had no history of military service, had no history of mental illness, and had a high school 
diploma – with many having some college experience.  Such findings are in keeping with what 
other researchers have also determined about the common characteristics of terrorists – the most 
significant being that they are often highly intelligent individuals, from middle to upper-class 
backgrounds, not suffering from clinical mental illness (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & Gruenwald, 
2015; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Sageman, 2008). This of course is 
not a surprising conclusion given that terrorist operations are often very complex undertakings 
requiring a great deal of preparation, strategic and tactical planning, technical knowledge, and 





The primary limitation of this study is that it focused exclusively on a sample of terrorists within 
in a single country, the United States. Because modern terrorist movements are certainly not 
confined to any one country, but instead, exist globally, it is reasonable to assume that the social 
environmental characteristics of any single county have a unique and significant impact on the 
manner in which terrorists exist in that country. As such, the results from this study are not 
directly applicable to terrorism in countries outside the United States. Even so, the study’s 
findings are in alignment with what other researchers have said about the sharp distinctions 
between political and religious terrorists when commenting on terrorism outside of the United 
States (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Piazza, 2009; Rapoport, 2001). Still, I suggest a 
great deal of caution be used with regard to generalizing these results to populations outside of 
the United States. 
Suggestions for Future Research  
 
This study based its classification of terrorists on three dimensions: demographics, personal 
history, and recruitment-radicalization processes. However, this is only one of many methods 
that can be used to classify terrorism. Researchers in the future will do well to consider using 
cluster analysis to group terrorism into typologies using other established criteria. For instance, 
Chenoweth and Lowham (2007) suggest using cluster analysis to develop typologies based on 
the methods and tactics that terrorists use when carrying out their attacks. In this way a more 
comprehensive picture of the varieties of terrorism can be established. In the future, researchers 
should also explore how the behaviour of individual terrorists differ from one another when their 
typology is factored in. One possible avenue for researchers to explore is to look at how 
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typologies impact the degree of formal involvement with a terrorist organization that is necessary 
before an individual attempts to carry out a terrorist attack. For example, the terrorists in one 
typology may be more likely to attempt to carry out an attack with little formal involvement or 
may be willing to act as lone wolves, while terrorists in another typology may not attempt an 
attack until formal connections within an organization have been established. Another possibility 
is to explore the extent to which typology is able to predict the severity of an attack that an 
individual is willing to engage in. These are only a few suggestions among a vast array of 




In this study two-step cluster analysis was used in an exploratory effort to determine what the 
primary typologies of terrorism are in the United States. The study’s findings suggest that the 
United States faces two overarching types of terrorism. The first one can most appropriately be 
classified as political extremism, which currently, is mainly represented by right-wing 
extremists, but has historically involved individuals all across the political spectrum. The second 
typology may be classified as religious extremism, which by in large, are composed of radical 
jihadist, although this is certainly not the only type of religious extremism connected to 
terrorism. This study also concluded that there are many commonalities among terrorists 
regardless of what cluster they fit into. Most notably, terrorists seem to be reasonably intelligent 
individuals, from middle to upper class backgrounds, who do not have a history of mental illness, 
criminal activity, or drug and alcohol abuse. These findings suggest that terrorists carry with 
them unique features that policymakers should be aware of when shaping counterterrorism 
policies. Moreover, policymakers should be aware that terrorists share some common 
characteristics that differentiate them from other types of deviant actors, which suggest that the 
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